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Abstract  Second order election models predict that voter turnout will generally be lower 
in ‘second order’ subnational elections compared to ‘first order’ federal elections. In 
Canada, we find that this is not always the case: some provinces have higher turnout rates 
for provincial elections than federal elections.  Using data from seven Canadian provincial 
elections, this article examines how attitudes such as trust, satisfaction with democracy 
and interest in politics compare across levels of government in order to explain cross-
provincial differences in voter turnout.  It finds that while contextual factors matter, 
interest in provincial politics is one of the strongest predictors of high provincial turnout 
relative to federal turnout.  
Keywords Second order elections; federal elections; provincial elections; voter turnout. 
 
Résumé:  Le modèle des élections de « deuxième niveau » prédit qu’un moindre 
pourcentage de l’électorat se présentera lors des élections provinciales de « deuxième 
niveau » que lors de celles fédérales de « premier niveau ». Au Canada ceci n’est pas 
toujours vrai. Dans certaines provinces, ceux qui votent aux élections provinciales sont plus 
nombreux qu’aux élections fédérales. En se référant aux données provenant de sept 
élections provinciales, cet article examine comment les comportements tels que la 
confiance, le degré de satisfaction de la démocratie et l’intérêt à la politique se comparent 
afin d’expliquer les différences en taux de participation. L’article constate que l’intérêt à la 
politique provinciale serait l’indicateur comportemental le plus important pour expliquer 
un taux de participation provincial plus élevé.  
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Theoretical Framework  
 
Political competition in Canada, as 
in other federations, occurs at multiple 
territorial levels.  In Canada, this 
competition has been said to operate in 
‘separate worlds’ at the provincial and 
federal level (Blake, 1982), a quality that 
sets Canada apart from other federations 
where competition at the national and the 
subnational level tends to be linked in a 
number of ways, for example, through 
integrated parties, second-order or 
barometer voting, consistent partisanship 
and the existence of similar party systems 
across electoral arenas. 
Research on political competition 
in multi-level systems has found that 
federal and subnational electoral arenas 
often become competitively linked. When 
linkage is high, the federal level context 
can shape vote choice in subnational 
elections through barometer effects, 
where voters use sub-national elections 
to express their approval or disapproval 
of national governing parties, and 
coattails voting effects. In these cases, 
political parties typically maintain strong 
organizational linkages between federal 
and regional levels of competition and 
very often the same parties compete at 
both the federal and subnational levels, 
with the result that party systems tend to 
be relatively similar.  Multi-level contexts 
can impede accountability mechanisms, 
and ‘second order’ arenas may suffer 
from lower turnout. In other words, in the 
minds of voters, subnational politics may 
be regarded as essentially derivative of 
federal politics, played out in a lower-
stakes setting.  Because less is ‘at stake’, 
voters may be less likely to vote in 
provincial elections than federal elections, 
and may treat their provincial vote as a 
proxy for federal-level evaluations.  
In contrast, when linkage in terms 
of political life is low, we may find 
incongruent party systems, split 
partisanship across levels and weak or 
absent party organizational linkages. An 
implication of this, at least theoretically, is 
that provincial politics in such systems 
emerges in the voters’ minds as an 
important and distinct arena. In Canada, 
such forms of party organizational and 
party system linkage have generally been 
found to be low when compared to other 
federations, but this is not uniformly the 
case across indicators of linkage or across 
provinces.  
This article examines one aspect of 
voter behaviour in multi-level systems 
that is often held to be indicative of such 
linked political competition between the 
federal and provincial levels: differences 
in turnout in federal and provincial 
elections. Canada stands out from other 
federations because it does not 
consistently fit the expected pattern of 
exhibiting lower turnout in provincial 
elections than federal elections.  Does 
high provincial voter turnout relative to 
federal turnout correspond to other 
forms of ‘low linkage’ across Canadian 
provinces? How do we explain inter-
provincial variations in relative turnout? 
As used in this article, the term 
‘high linkage’ refers to multi-level 
systems where competition is influenced 
or constrained by competition at another 
jurisdictional level and where both voters 
and parties assign hierarchical 
importance to these jurisdictions. This 
article uses the term ‘low linkage’ to refer 
to a competitive context in which voters 
and parties operate in these jurisdictions 
in a more independent manner: here we 
may find different parties and party 
systems, an absence of barometer voting 
and high interest by the electorate in 
these elections. In general, high linkage 
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systems are those in which we might 
reasonably interpret a subnational 
election result in terms of the message it 
sends about support for the nationally 
incumbent party. Low linkage systems are 
those where we find ‘separate worlds’ of 
competition occurring. 
In comparative federalism 
research, the norm is generally a model of 
linked competition.  Theories of how 
political competition occurs in multi-level 
systems have argued that subnational 
elections often operate as ‘second-order’ 
to national contests (Reif and Schmidt, 
1980: 8) and as barometers of voters’ 
assessments of the federally incumbent 
government (van der Eijk and Franklin, 
1996; van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 
1996; Anderson and Ward, 1996; 
Anderson and Wlezien, 1997).  
Forms of multi-level linkage can 
encompass a range of other behaviours. 
Barometer, second-order, and coattails 
models of electoral behaviour, which can 
all be applied to multi-level political 
competition, predict a scenario where 
political competition at the national and 
subnational levels of government 
becomes linked  (Rodden and Wibbels 
(2011) refer to this as the 
‘nationalization’ of party competition).  
This linkage, together with the complexity 
of a multi-level voting environment can 
blur lines of accountability, making it 
difficult for voters to punish or reward 
governments for their performance 
(Whitten and Powell, 1993; Ebeid and 
Rodden, 2006; Anderson, 2006; Rodden 
and Wibbels, 2011) or leading voters to 
punish subnational voters for federal-
level performance (Gélineau and 
Bélanger, 2005) or vice versa (Gélineau 
and Remmer, 2006).  Linkage can be 
weakened by split partisanship across 
levels of government (Blake, 1982; 
Stewart and Clarke, 1998; Martinez, 1990; 
Uslaner, 1990) which in turn can be 
driven by dissimilar party systems at each 
level of government.  The concept of 
linkage need not be confined to the level 
of voter behaviour.  Structural forms of 
linkage can include party organizations 
that are integrated across levels of 
government (Filippov, Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova, 2004: 190) and party systems 
that are congruent—or similar—across 
the units of a federation (Thorlakson, 
2007).  
Cross-nationally, the degree of 
linkage across federal systems varies. It 
also varies across the provinces in 
Canada, as we will discuss below.  Linked 
or nationalized competition has been 
found to be related to the degree of 
decentralization. The more decentralized 
the federation, the weaker these multi-
level linkages tend to be (Chhibber and 
Kollman, 2004; Léon, 2012; Thorlakson, 
2007; Jeffery and Hough, 2009; Schakel, 
2011). Strong regional cleavages are 
associated with weaker linkages, 
especially when these cleavages are 
mobilized into regional parties (Schakel, 
2011; Jeffery and Hough, 2009) and 
dissimilar party systems. These parties at 
the sub-national level, and the voters who 
support them, have motivation and 
opportunity to go their own way, less 
constrained by federal political 
competition. Finally, some forms of 
linkage have been found to facilitate 
others: structural linkage, in the form of 
party system congruence, can facilitate 
consistent partisan attachments (Blake, 
1982).1  
Indeed, the Canadian provinces 
provide a unique opportunity for 
studying the attitudinal correlates of 
multi-level linkage.  Research has singled 
out Canada for not conforming to the 
expectations of multi-level linkage 
theories in terms of voter turnout 
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(Studler, 2001; Wolinetz and Carty, 2006; 
Jeffery and Hough, 2009), its high degree 
of party system incongruence 
(Thorlakson, 2007), low degree of party 
system nationalization (Chhibber and 
Kollman, 2004), and low degree of 
vertical integration of party organizations 
(Thorlakson, 2009).  However, these 
findings are not uniformly the case across 
the Canadian provinces. Party systems 
generally have exhibited a high degree of 
congruence in the Atlantic provinces and 
Ontario, and low congruence in Quebec 
and the western provinces (Stewart and 
Carty, 2006). Similarly, integrative 
linkages between federal and provincial 
parties tend to be highest in Atlantic 
Canada, and historically have been 
weakest in British Columbia, Alberta and 
Quebec (Thorlakson, 2009), although this 
varies by party.  
This provides an opportunity to 
compare conforming and non-conforming 
provinces to identify differences in the 
attitudinal underpinnings of second order 
behaviour. Factors such as social 
cleavages, the competitiveness of 
provincial elections and issues specific to 
provincial leaders and provincial 
campaigns may contribute to variations in 
the outcome, but all provincial elections 
allow a comparison to the same federal 
elections.  
While partisanship and vote choice 
have been well-studied as indicators of 
linkage in Canada, less is known about 
turnout. This chapter investigates the 
attitudinal underpinnings of one form of 
linkage, the turnout effect of ‘second 
order’ elections, in order to better explain 
variation across Canadian provinces and 
to help us understand the micro-level 
mechanisms that link contextual factors 
to the values and beliefs that motivate 
behaviour. 
In linked systems, ‘second order’ 
subnational (or supranational) elections 
typically exhibit a pattern of lower 
turnout compared to ‘first order’ national 
elections. This is assumed to arise from 
the perception by voters that less is at 
stake in these elections, and, following 
this, that voters have less interest in these 
elections motivating them to vote (Reif 
and Schmidt, 1980: 8). The second order 
effect is expected to be more pronounced 
in more centralized federations and 
weakest in decentralized federations like 
Canada (Jeffery and Hough, 2009).2  That 
‘less is at stake’ in subnational elections is 
often assumed because provincial or state 
governments control smaller budgets and 
smaller policy ranges than their federal 
counterparts. While these objective 
measures of fiscal decentralization or 
jurisdictional assignment play an 
important role in shaping the perceived 
‘importance’ of a level of government, 
translating this institutional environment 
into voter behaviour depends upon 
voters’ perceptions of the second order 
arena. These perceptions, the attitudinal 
foundations of linkage, are rarely 
empirically verified.  
When voting behaviour does not 
conform to linkage theories, we would 
expect that, first, voters would perceive 
the impact and importance of the 
provincial level of government to be 
relatively high compared to the perceived 
impact and importance of the federal 
government.  
A perception that the subnational 
level is important does not necessarily 
imply that a voter is interested and 
engaged in provincial level politics. We 
would expect voters to generally have a 
higher degree of interest in provincial 
politics relative to federal politics in 
provinces where elections do not exhibit 
second order voting patterns. This is 
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likely to be positively associated with 
voters’ perception of importance and 
impact but nevertheless is conceptually 
distinct. Assessing voters’ interest more 
directly captures whether voters are 
likely to pay attention and be politically 
engaged with subnational politics.   
Finally, political engagement at the 
subnational level is also likely to be 
affected by voters’ sense of satisfaction 
with the performance of democracy at the 
subnational level.  It is also plausible that 
the decision to vote more often in 
provincial elections than federal elections 
is fuelled by a more negative form of 
interest in and identification with 
province—a sense of grievance that the 
province is treated worse than other 
provinces by the federal government.  
Apart from factors that are related 
to linkage arguments, voter turnout in 
provincial elections relative to federal 
elections can also be affected by a number 
of factors that have been shown to affect 
turnout generally. These include the 
competitiveness or closeness of the race 
(Blais, 2000; Franklin, 2004), age 
(Putnam, 1995; 2000; Verba, Schlozman 




The Comparative Provincial 
Election Project (CPEP) dataset provides 
a unique opportunity to address 
multilevel linkage because it provides 
questions on trust, efficacy and impact 
directed toward both the provincial and 
federal governments. This allows us to 
assess the impact of the relative 
difference in attitudes toward provincial 
and federal levels of government.  The 
CPEP dataset was created through a 
series of post-election surveys in eight 
Canadian provincial elections (Prince 
Edward Island, Manitoba, Ontario, 
Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Alberta, Quebec and British 
Columbia) held between October 2011 
and May 2013.3 The dataset comprises 
6710 cases.  The CPEP data is cross-
sectional but not longitudinal.  
All attitudinal variables are drawn 
from identically worded questions in 
eight provincial CPEP post-election 
surveys.  To measure the perceived 
impact and importance of the provincial 
and federal levels of government, the 
analysis uses se two different categorical 
variables. One is the level of government 
that voters name as having the most 
impact on their lives. A second asks 
voters to name the level of government 
that best looks after their interests. Both 
of these variables plausibly tell us about 
the saliency for voters of the provincial 
electoral arena. Satisfaction with 
democracy at both the federal and 
provincial levels is measured with 
variables using four-item Likert scales 
(very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied and not satisfied at all). A 
categorical variable capturing a sense of 
provincial grievance is based on a 
question that asks voters whether they 
think that the federal government treats 
their province better, worse or about the 
same as other provinces.  All of these 
variables are constructed as dummy 
variables in the regression analysis. 
Voters’ interest in provincial 
politics is measured using variables 
generated from survey questions that ask 
respondents to rate their interest in 
provincial or federal politics on a scale of 
0 to 10. Interest in provincial politics is 
measured in relative terms with a 
constructed categorical variable which is 
coded 1 if voters report that their interest 
in provincial politics is greater than their 
interest in federal politics.  Finally, the 
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analysis controls for two additional 
variables shown to affect political 
mobilization:  age (Putnam, 1995, 2000; 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) and 
education (Lipset, 1960).  
This chapter uses an aggregate 
level analysis to assess the relationship 
between multi-level linkage in political 
competition and attitudes such as 
perceived impact of levels of government 
and voters’ interest in them. The 
aggregate level analysis assesses whether 
citizens’ perceived impact of and interest 
in provincial government is greater in low 
linkage than in high linkage provinces.  
Canadian provinces are 
categorized as high or low linkage based 
upon average difference between federal 
and provincial turnout scores from 1993 
to 2013. The analysis then tests whether 
aggregate level patterns of attitudes 
observed in these provinces conform to 
expectations. Attitudinal indicators 
include perceptions of which level of 
government has the greatest impact on 
the respondent’s life, which level of 
government best looks after the 
respondent’s interests, degree of interest 
in provincial politics compared to federal 
politics, satisfaction with democracy at 
the provincial level compared to 
satisfaction with democracy at the federal 
level, and sense of provincial grievance. 
Independent t-tests are used to test for 
the significance of differences in 
attitudinal scores between high and low 




While the case of Canada has been 
shown in the past to not conform to the 
second order election expectation of 
lower subnational voter participation 
rates compared to those in federal 
elections, this is not a uniform pattern 
across the Canadian provinces (see 
Wolinetz and Carty, 2006).  To identify 
high and low linkage provinces (that is, 
those that conform to the expectations of 
second order behaviour and those that do 
not), We compare average provincial and 
federal voter turnout rates for a 20-year 
period, 1993-2013 (see Table 1). 
While the second order election 
thesis would predict that subnational 
elections, with less ‘at stake’, would 
exhibit lower turnout than federal 
elections, the opposite is true for most 
Canadian provinces.  For this time period, 
only British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba 
and Ontario exhibit federal voter turnout 
that is higher on average than provincial 
voter turnout, as expected by the second 
order model of multi-level political 
competition.   
Independent t-tests confirm that 
the difference in provincial and federal 
turnout rates is statistically significant 
only in Alberta, Ontario, Saskatchewan, 
Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland 
and Labrador (NL). For the elections held 
during that time period, the mean turnout 
in provincial elections in Alberta and 
Ontario was significantly lower than the 
mean turnout for federal elections in 
those provinces. In Saskatchewan, Prince 
Edward Island (PEI) and NL, turnout 
rates in provincial elections were higher 
than those for federal elections in those 
provinces, and t-tests tell us that this 
difference is not due to chance.  
On the basis of relative voter 
turnout, only Alberta and Ontario exhibit 
classic ‘second order’ behaviour that we 
would expect from a context of ‘high 
linkage’ political competition. In these 
provinces, federal voter turnout is on 
average higher than provincial voter 
turnout. In contrast, Saskatchewan, PEI 
and NL do not conform to the voter 
turnout expectations of second order 
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voting. In these cases, voter turnout 
patterns do not serve as a form of high 
linkage competition. Instead, the pattern 
of consistently higher turnout for 
provincial elections is behaviour we 
might expect from contexts of low 
political linkage.  British Columbia, 
Manitoba and Quebec neither reliably 
conform to the expectations of second 
order voting nor reliably disprove these.  
 
Table 1: Average voter turnout and standard deviation in Canadian federal and provincial elections, 
1993-2013 
Province Federal election turnout Provincial election 
turnout 













NL 53.4 3.4 69.7 8.7 -16.3 high 
PE 72.1 1.5 82.5 3.1 -10.4 high 
QC 66.2 5.9 72.3 7.7 -6.1 low 
SK 63.3 3.5 68.8 4.2 -5.5 low 
NB 67.4 3.5 71.2 3.3 -3.8 high 
NS 63.6 2.7 66.2 3.4 -2.6 high 
MB 61.2 4.0 60.8 6.5 0.4 high 
BC 63.4 2.5 62.4 8.0 1.0 low 
ON 62.8 3.6 55.7 5.1 7.1 high 
AB 59.0 3.8 51.2 6.5 7.8 low 
Source: Elections Canada, provincial elections agencies. Statistically significant differences in federal and 
provincial turnout means indicated by bold text.  
Before moving on to the analysis of 
attitudinal correlates of second order 
voting behaviour, it is worth noting the 
extent to which patterns of high and low 
linkage in terms of second order voting 
behaviour correspond to patterns of 
structural indicators of linkage (party 
system congruence and party 
organizational linkage). Of the two 
provinces that exhibit classic ‘second 
order’ voter turnout patterns, Ontario 
also has the high-linkage features of a 
party system that is broadly congruent 
with that of the federal party system. In 
Alberta, we find ‘high linkage’ second 
order voting patterns coupled with 
structural indicators of low linkage: this 
includes its highly dissimilar party 
system, characterized by its one party 
dominance, as well as its party 
organizational truncation with federal 
parties. Indeed, it is likely that Alberta’s 
long tradition of one-party dominance has 
played an important role in its provincial 
voter participation rates (see Siaroff and 
Wesley, this edition).  Among the 
provinces classified as low linkage, only in 
Saskatchewan is this reinforced by 
structural incongruence. Ontario, 
therefore, may serve as an ideal-typical 
case of a high-linkage province, and 
Saskatchewan fits the ideal-typical case of 
a low-linkage province.  
Finally, it is worth noting that with 
the exception of New Brunswick, turnout 
is more volatile in provincial elections 
than federal elections. This holds true 
when federal turnout rates are measured 
by province, as they are here, as well as 
when aggregated at the national level. 
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This suggests that the competitive context 
and campaign effects may have stronger 
mobilizational influence at the provincial 
than federal level. Do the high linkage and 
low linkage provinces differ in the 
attitudes that we find? We next assess five 
different attitudinal measures: the 
perceived impact of the federal and 
provincial levels of government, the 
perceived efficacy of the government 
(which level of government best looks 
after your interests), relative interest in 
provincial and federal politics, 
satisfaction with provincial and federal 
government and a sense of provincial 
grievance. Independent t tests are used to 
compare the scores of provinces in the 
high linkage and low linkage groups and 
assess the significance of these group 
differences. We find that the provinces 
with lower provincial turnout relative to 
federal turnout, Ontario, Manitoba and 
Alberta, (those with second order voting 
patterns) are those that have the lowest 
aggregate scores of perceived impact of 
the provincial government (Table 2). 
With exception of Prince Edward Island, 
which has a high level of perceived impact 
of the federal government, these 
provinces that are ‘high linkage in terms 
of their voter turnout patterns have the 
highest assessments of federal impact.  
The findings are similar when we 
assess respondents’ perceptions of the 
level of government that best looks after 
their interests (Table 2). Again, the high 
linkage provinces had the lowest 
percentage agreeing that the provincial 
government best looked after their 
interests, and, again, with the exception of 
Prince Edward Island, respondents in 
these provinces were more likely to name 
the federal government as best looking 
after their interests.  
As predicted, higher degrees of 
interest in provincial politics relative to 
federal politics can explain high 
provincial election turnout relative to 
federal turnout (Table 2). The provinces 
classified as low linkage (and so not 
conforming to second order expectations) 
also exhibit the highest degree of interest 
in provincial politics relative to federal 
politics.  
Canadians generally report greater 
satisfaction with provincial democracy 
than federal democracy (Table 3). In the 
low linkage provinces, voters tend to be 
more satisfied with provincial than 
federal democracy.  
Independent t-tests confirm that 
there is a significant difference between 
the high linkage and low linkage groups of 
provinces in terms of aggregate scores for 
provincial impact, difference in interest in 
provincial politics compared to interest in 
and federal politics, and those who 
identify the provincial government as 
best looking after their interests.4 Rates of 
satisfaction with provincial compared to 
federal democracy and provincial 
grievance are not significantly different 
between the two groups. We find the 
clearest attitudinal difference between 
the high and low linkage groups in terms 
of the proportion of people who have a 
greater interest in provincial politics than 
federal politics.  
We find distinct sets of political 
attitudes in provinces where provincial 
voter turnout tends to be higher than 
federal voter turnout. Voters in provinces 
where turnout tends to be higher for 
provincial than federal elections generally 
report higher degrees of interest in 
provincial politics, and tend the view the 
provincial, rather than federal 
government, as having the most impact 
over their lives and best looking after 
their interests. In provinces where 
satisfaction with provincial democracy most 
outstrips satisfaction with federal 
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democracy, we also find high levels of 
provincial turnout.  Turnout in provincial 
elections can therefore tell us something 
important about the state of provincial 
democracy and how well provincial 
governments connect to their citizens.  
The standard ‘second order’ model 
of higher federal than subnational voter 
turnout suggests a form of linked political 
competition between two levels where 
the subnational level is assumed to be less 
important than the federal level. Other 
elements of the second order model hold 
that when voters do participate in 
subnational elections, they link the two 
levels of competition by using the 
subnational vote to (typically) punish a 
federally incumbent party. Canada 
presents an interesting challenge to this 
widely accepted way of viewing multi-
level voting behaviour.  We find several 
provinces with higher provincial than 
federal voter turnout, challenging a core 
assumption of the second order model of 
linked behaviour: if this turnout pattern 
means that voters regard the provincial 
arena to be a more important site of 
competition than the federal arena, is it 
difficult to then argue that provincial level 
vote choice is derivative of voter 
assessments at the federal level.  It opens 
the possibility for voting behaviour at the 
provincial level that is relatively 
uncoupled from that at the federal level.  
Interestingly, relative turnout in 
provincial and federal elections is not not 
reliably predicted by whether similar 
parties or party systems are in place at 
both federal and provincial levels.  In 
other words, federal-provincial turnout 
differences do not correspond very 
consistently with party and party system 
indicators of linkage. Only in Ontario 
(high linkage) and in Saskatchewan (low 
linkage) do both turnout and structural 
party and party system indicators of 
linkage correspond. Otherwise, having a 
markedly different party system at the 
provincial level, or parties with no federal 
counterpart, is no guarantee that voters 
will be interested in provincial 
government or believe it to have greater 
impact, and, ultimately, does not 
necessarily translate into a tendency 
toward higher turnout in provincial 
elections.   
What is clear from the survey data 
is that interest in provincial politics 
relative to federal politics is one of the 
strongest attitudinal dimensions of 
difference between the provinces with 
high provincial turnout relative to federal 
turnout. This turns out to be more 
consistent than measures of impact.  
The Canadian case might present 
the study of comparative federalism with 
an interesting challenge to the second 
order thesis.  In Canada, the federal and 
provincial levels of competition may be 
linked through vertical party 
organizational ties or through similar 
party systems.  This does not necessarily 
correspond to consistently lower 
provincial level voter turnout. Instead, 
relative turnout appears to operate 
separately from these forms of linked 
political competition, driven by high 
levels of voter interest in provincial 
politics, a sense that the provincial level 
of government has the greatest impact on 
their life and that the provincial 
government best looks after their 
interests.  These are the attitudinal 
foundations of multi-level political 
competition that fosters strong voter 
orientations toward provincial politics. It 
does not occur uniformly across the 
country and it is not always reflected by 
the structures of political competition, 
such as party system similarity.  
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Source: Elections Canada, provincial elections agencies. High linkage provinces are depicted in bold text. Respondents were asked the following 
questions: ‘In general, which government looks after your interests better, the federal government, the provincial government, the municipal 




 Level of government that best  
looks after interests 
Level of government with 
 greatest impact on life 
Greater interest in 
provincial than federal 
government 
Province Fed Prov Mun Not  
sure 
n Fed Prov Mun Not  
sure 
n  n 
NL 14.1 59.2   7.7 18.0 133   8.0 48.7 11.0 30.8 133 36.7 107 
QC 10.1 68.2   9.4 11.9 1551 10.6 48.1   6.8 34.3 1551 44.6 1599 
SK 16.6 56.6   6.6 19.1 262   7.2 46.3   5.8 39.0 262 22.2 207 
PE 25.9 54.3   4.7 13.9 39 18.5 38.5   7.7 33.7 39 31.5 27 
MB 22.6 39.8 16.4 21.2 277 21.7 30.0   8.8 36.6 277 14.2 241 
AB 16.9 48.7 18.5 14.8 708 14.6 26.0 17.7 40.3 708 14.7 697 
ON 21.4 42.5 19.4 16.7 2730 23.6 25.4 12.7 36.9 2730 6.9 2583 
BC 20.1 47.5 13.9 17.5 873 10.9 21.9 22.8 44.4 873 16.5 873 
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Table 3: Satisfaction with federal and provincial democracy, rank ordered from greatest to least 
difference between provincial and federal satisfaction, and sense of provincial grievance: percent 
responding that the federal government treats their province worse than other provinces 






 Difference  





 % very or fairly 
satisfied 
% very or fairly 
satisfied 
n   n 
NL 59.7 75.6 107 15.9   68.8 27 
QC 50.7 64.8 1599 14.1 54.6 107 
SK 71.5 80.9 207 9.4 39.4 1599 
MB 66.7 73.0 241 6.3 28.9 207 
ON 60.2 66.1 2559 5.9 32.6 241 
BC 47.5 52.7 873 5.2 43.6 2583 
AB 66.0 69.1 697 3.1 41.4 873 
High linkage provinces depicted in bold text. Columns present percentage responding that they are very 
satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy at that level of government and percentage reporting a sense 





Anderson, Cameron. 2006. Economic Voting 
and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative 
Individual-Level Analysis. American 
Journal of Political Science 50:449-63. 
Anderson, Christopher and Daniel Ward. 1996.  
Barometer Elections in Comparative 
Perspective. Electoral Studies 15(4):447-
460.  
Anderson, Christopher and Christopher 
Wlezien. 1997. The Economics of Politics 
in Comparative Perspective Revisited: An 
Introduction. Political Behavior 19(1):1-5.  
Blais, Andre. 2000. To Vote or Not to Vote: The 
Merits and Limits of Rational Choice 
Theory. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press.  
Blake, Donald. 1982. The Consistency of 
Inconsistency: Party Identification in 
Federal and Provincial Politics. Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 15(4):691-710.  
 
Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 2004. 
The Formation of National Party Systems: 
Federalism and Party Competition in 
Canada, Great Britain, India and the United 
States. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Ebeid, Michael and Jonathan Rodden. 2006. 
Economic Geography and Economic 
Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States. 
British Journal of Political Science 36:527-
47.  
van der Eijk, Cees and Mark Franklin. 1996. 
Choosing Europe? The European electorate 
and national politics in the face of union. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
van der Eijk, Cees, Mark Franklin and Michael 
Marsh. 1996. What Voters Teach Us About 
Europe-wide Elections. What Europe-wide 
Elections Teach Us About Voters. Electoral 
Studies 15(2):149-166.  
Filippov, Mikhail, Peter Ordeshook and Olga 
Shvetsova. 2004. Designing Federalism: A 
Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal 
Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, 164-176 
175 
 
Franklin, Mark. 2004. Voter turnout and the 
Dynamics of Electoral Competition in 
Established Democracies since 1945. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Gélineau, François and Éric Bélanger. 
2005. Electoral Accountability in a 
Federal System: National and 
Provincial Economic Voting in Canada. 
Publius, 35(3): 407-24. 
Gélineau, François and Karen Remmer. 
2006. Political Decentralization and 
Electoral Accountability: The Argentine 
Experience, 1983-2001. British Journal 
of Political Science, 36(1):133-57.  
Jeffery, Charlie and Dan Hough. 2009. 
Understanding Post-Devolution Elections 
in Scotland and Wales in Comparative 
Perspective. Party Politics 15(2):219-240.  
León, Sandra. 2012. How does 
decentralization affect electoral 
competition of state-wide parties? 
Evidence from Spain. Party Politics online 
first, 26 February 2012.  
Lipset, S.M. 1960. Political Man: the social 
bases of politics. New York: Doubleday.  
Martinez, Michael. 1990. Partisan 
Reinforcement in Context and Cognition: 
Canadian Federal Partisanships, 1974-7. 
American Journal of Political Science 
34(3):322-45.  
Powell, G.B. and Whitten, G.D. 1993. A cross-
national analysis of economic voting: 
taking account of political context. 
American Journal of Political Science 37(2): 
391-414.  
Putnam, Robert. 1995. Tuning in, Tuning Out; 
The Strange Disappearance of Social 
Capital in America. PS: Politics and Political 
Science 28: 664-683.  
Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone. New 
York: Simon and Schuster.  
Reif K and H Schmidt. 1980. Nine Second-
Order National Elections: A Conceptual 
Framework for the Analysis of European 
Election Results, European Journal of 
Political Research 8(1):3-45.  
Rodden, Jonathan and Erik Wibbels. 2011. 
Dual accountability and the nationalization 
of party competition: Evidence from four 
federations. Party Politics 17(5):629-653.  
Schakel, Arjan. 2011. Congruence Between 
Regional and National Elections. 
Comparative Political Studies. Online First, 
published 18 October 2011.  
Stewart, David, and R. Kenneth Carty. 2006. 
Many Political Worlds?  Provincial Parties 
and Party Systems. In Provinces: Canadian 
Provincial Politics, edited by C. Dunn. 2nd 
Ed.  Peterborough: Broadview. 
Stewart, Marianne and Clarke, Harold. 1998. 
The Dynamics of Party Identification in 
Federal Systems: The Canadian Case. 
American Journal of Political Science 
42(1):97-116.  
Studler, D.T. 2001. Canadian Exceptionalism: 
Explaining Differences over Time in 
Provincial and Federal Voter Turnout. 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 
34(2):299-319.  
Thorlakson, Lori. 2007. An institutional 
explanation of party system congruence: 
Evidence from six federations. European 
Journal of Political Research 46(1), 69-95. 
Thorlakson, Lori. 2009. Patterns of party 
integration, influence and autonomy in 
seven federations. Party Politics 
15(2):157-178. 
Uslaner, Eric. 1990. Splitting Image: Partisan 
Affiliations in Canada’s ‘Two Political 
Worlds’.  American Journal of Political 
Science 34(4):961-81.  
Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman and Henry 
Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Wolinetz, Steven and Ken Carty. 2006. 
Disconnected competition in Canada. In 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, 164-176 
176 
 
Devolution and electoral politics, edited by 
Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
                                                             
Endnotes 
 
1 Dissimilarity between federal and provincial 
party systems can be a structural impediment to 
the formation and maintenance of consistent 
partisan identifications at the federal and 
provincial levels (Blake,1982). Logically, 
dissimilar party systems and parties could also 
impede barometer voting. (In fact Jeffery and 
Hough  (1999) exclude the case of Canada from 
their comparison of barometer voting because 
party system dissimilarity makes it difficult to 
assess).  Schakel (2011) finds that low turnout is 
associated with party system congruence (a 
structural indicator of high linkage). Partisan 
relations between levels of government have 
been found to be an important factor in the 
development of linkage (Rodden and Wibbels, 
2011:19). It is argued that parties that are 
vertically integrated across levels of government 
encourage voters, as well as party members, to 
forge an allegiance with the party as a whole, 
rather than only with one particular level of the 
organization (Filippov, Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova, 2004:190).  
2 Decentralization has been found to affect other 
forms of linkage, too, for example by weakening 
national coattails effects in voting (Léon, 2012) 
and impeding the development of nationalized 
party systems (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004).  
3 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are excluded 
from the analysis. CPEP data was not available 
for these provinces at the time of writing.  
4 For the percentage expressing higher interest 
in politics at the provincial level than at other 
levels, t=3.119, two-tailed significance = 0.053 
with 3 degrees of freedom.  The difference 
between high and low linkage provinces for 
those naming the provincial government as 
having the highest impact on their life, t=4.269, 
two-tailed significance = 0.024, 3 degrees of 
freedom. For the percentage responding that the 
provincial government best looks after their 
interests, t = 4.707, two –tailed significance = 
.018, 3 degrees of freedom. For satisfaction with 
                                                                                                 
provincial democracy relative to satisfaction 
with federal democracy, t = .700, two-tailed 
significance =.534, 3 degrees of freedom. For 
provincial grievance, t = 1.111, two-tailed 
significance - .348, 3 degrees of freedom.  
